THE COLLAPSE OF THE CONFEDERACY 



^ 



; 487 
G49 
lopy 1 



BY 



LAWRENCE H. GIPSON 

Professor of History and Political Science 
Wabash College 




Reprinted from the Mississippi 
Valley Historical Review 
Vol. IV, March, 1918 



THE COLLAPSE OF THE CONFEDERACY ' 

It has been customary for writers to account for the collapse 
of the southern confederacy by reason of exhaustion and strang- 
ulation due to the successful operation of the federal ''anacon- 
da" system. While the effectiveness of the northern military 
and naval strategy cannot be denied, there are other factors that 
tended powerfully to supplement this and these factors are be- 
coming increasingly the subject of careful investigation. 

It has well been stated that France in the present great war 
is in almost perfect state of defense. Every element of her 
strength is directed to that end, every private interest has been 
brushed aside in the face of the great menace and a wonderfully 
united people are fighting to the death. The south, it should be 
appreciated, was never in that situation. No one can deny that 
many of her generals possessed fine capacity or can assert that 
her armies w^ere lacking in valor; but there were some things 
that she sorely needed which were almost as important as 
efficient generals and hard-fighting troops. Had she possessed 
those things, it is doubtful if she could ever have been conquered. 

In this study an attempt has been made to point out certain 
vital weaknesses in the confederate defense which were not pre- 
eminently of a military character but which affected profoundly 
the military fortunes of the south. The factors here to be an- 
alyzed are those which may be considered essentially psycholog- 
ical in nature. At least four psychological conditions, it may be 
suggested, should be satisfied in order to allow a people to pros- 
ecute with maximum efficiency any great armed conflict. First, 
there should be leadership of such a character as to inspire the 
highest confidence; second, the circumstances giving rise to the 
struggle should be such as to make a profound appeal to a peo- 
ple's sense of righteousness; third, the end to be achieved should 
be clear and definite and worthy of any sacrifice ; fourth, there 
should exist a whole-souled consecration of the people them- 

1 Read at the annual meeting of the Mississippi valley historical association in 
Chicago, April 27, 1917. 



438 Lawrence H. Gipson ^- ^- ^- ^• 

selves to whatever end they have in view. It is proposed to ex- 
amine the confederate defense, to determine, if possible, how 
far these psychological conditions were fulfilled. 

In taking up for consideration the factor of leadership, it may 
be stated, first of all, that the sharpest controversies arising out 
of the creation and the subsequent downfall of the confederacy 
have to do with the question of Jefferson Davis' capacity to 
direct southern affairs. It is not too much to say that practical- 
ly every issue that confronted the south from 1849 to 1865 is 
most intimately connected with his name. The problem of the 
expansion of slavery westward; the attitude that the southern 
states should take toward the abolition propaganda; their atti- 
tude toward the republican party; the momentous decision in 
favor of secession; the relations of the confederate government 
to the states within it, to the army that fought for it, to the for- 
eign powers that might have recognized it, and to the federal 
government that at last overwhelmed it, can only be studied in 
connection with the positive and powerful influence which Mr. 
Davis exerted upon the course of events as a leader of southern 
thought.- It should be made clear that the south had had every 
opportunity to study and to learn to know the man that she chose 
to carry her through the secession crisis. Ever since the days 
of the Prentiss debate in Vicksburg courtyard in 1843, he had 
been a marked man. It must therefore be taken for granted 
that when his name was brought forward in the Montgomery 
convention the majority of the delegates, at least, were con- 
vinced that taking everything into consideration he was the best 
qualified man available for the presidency. The question arises, 
what type of man w^as Mr. Davis in the light of his presecession 
record? 

It is not easy to decide what conceptions formed the basis of 
Mr. Davis' political faith.^ He was hardly a nationalist, he 

2 The supposition that Davis' innuenee upon southern affairs first became pro- 
nouneetl when he was made president is erroneous. As Rliodes has i>oint«d out, Davis 
was considered to be the ablest senator from tlie south. James F. Rliodes, ULttory 
of the United States from the compromise of 1850 (New York, 1893-1906), 2: 294. 

3 Mr. N. W. Stephenson in a recent study has developed the theory that Mr. Davis 
did not understand himself. "His political philosophy is not a true vehicle for hia 
basal impulses — as Calhoun's was, as Webster's was — but a mere weapon caught 
ready to his hand from tlie hands of its makers, the men whom it genuinely ex- 



Vol. rv, No. 4 j/^e Collapse of the Confederacy 439 

was hardly a states' rights man; passionately devoted to the 
institution of slavery, which he called a ''divine institution,"* 
he would have sacrificed it in his effort to build a strong south- 
ern nation, the basis of which should rest upon extreme states' 
rights principles! 

Mr. Davis first came into political prominence as an ardent 
supporter and disciple of Calhoun. In his memoirs, however, 
he declared that nullification was "a doctrine to which I have 
never assented. ' ' ^ Calhoun without nullification, in the early 
forties as well as in the thirties, was almost like playing Hamlet 
without Hamlet. While repudiating nullification, if we can be- 
lieve his own words, he curiously enough had so sympathized 
with South Carolina in her effort to exploit that doctrine that 
he would have torn up his lieutenant's commission in 1832 rath- 
er than be a party to coercing her." Neither was there agree- 
ment between Calhoun and Davis regarding the war with Mexico 
nor with reference to internal improvements. Thus while ac- 
knowledging Calhoun as the source of his political inspiration, 
Jefferson Davis up until the late forties appeared to repudiate 
the most characteristic Calhoun theories and policies. 

This inconsistency of attitude appeared also in the positions 
that at various times he assumed regarding the powers of the 
president. At one moment he attacked Polk for executive usur- 
pation in bringing on war with Mexico ; ^ but he soon not only 
turned to his defense but enlisted. After the war, in answer to 
an attack upon Polk by Calhoun, he declared himself, for one, 
"willing to leave every military question to the President and 
his advisers ; ' ' and ' ' outdid the Federalists of 1789 in ascribing 
powers to the President." ® Yet, when Polk appointed him brig- 
adier-general of volunteers for distinguished military service, 
he refused the honor, declaring that the president had no author- 
pressed. " N. W. Stephenson, "A theory of Jefferson Davis," in American his- 
torical review, 21 : 85, 

* Speech in Jackson, Mississippi, October 14, 1857. 

5 Jefferson Davis, The rise and fall of the confederate government (New York, 
1881), 1: 230. 

6 See Congressional gloie, 31 congress, 1 session, July 13, 1850. 

7 Tor a careful discussion of this see William E. Dodd, Jefferson Davis (Philadel- 
phia, 1907), 77 ei seq. 

&Ibid., 99. 



440 Lawrence H. Gipson ^- ^- ^- ^• 

ity to make such appointments.'' The same shiftiness character- 
ized him during the crisis of 1849. After Calhoun 's ' ' Southern 
Address," Mr. Davis advocated secession unless the demands of 
the southern states of 36° 30' to the Pacific coast were met. Al- 
though these demands were denied and he ran for governor on an 
avowedly secessionist ticket, he felt compelled during the cam- 
paign to disavow his position and to declare that there was no 
occasion as yet for secession. His record in the Kansas-Nebras- 
ka issue is still more astonishing. In 1854 he personally con- 
ducted Douglas to President Pierce to secure the support of the 
latter in the repeal of the Missouri compromise and the substitu- 
tion of the doctrine of squatter sovereignty in its place. ^° Later, 
he denied that he had ever favored this plan and denounced 
Douglas for devising it. Moreover, as a member of the Pierce 
cabinet he lent his support as far as possible to the border Mis- 
sourians in their attempt to destroy local government in Kansas, 
exhibiting, as Rhodes says, an utter lack of fairness; but soon 
afterwards he fell back upon the most uncompromising state sov- 
ereignty position. In fact, down to the very hour of the Mont- 
gomery convention, Mr. Davis' public career had been an amaz- 
ing tangle of marches and countermarches. He was, however, 
consistent in one respect and that was in his support of whatever 
he thought to be southern interests. Whenever he saw these in- 
terests imperiled he was disposed to go to extremes and he not 
infrequently gave his support to operations which were exceed- 
ingly questionable in character.^^ 

There were times, it is true, when a big outlook appeared to 
animate Mr. Davis, In connection with the river and harbor 
bill in 1846, in his position on the Oregon question, and in his 
desire to bind the union together by a band of steel, he showed 
a large and fine patriotism. But one can hardly avoid the con- 
clusion that he was gradually drawn into the meshes of a blind 
sectionalism which at last shut out any vision of national welfare 
and which dwarfed what native capacity he might have possessed 
for sane leadership. In serving his section, he turned his back 

9 Davis, Else and fall nf the confederate Qovernment, 1: ,360. 

10 Ehodes, History of the United States from the compromise of 1850, 1: 425-437. 

11 Not only has his conrluct been severely condemned in connection with the Kan- 
sas issue, but there seems to be substantial proof tliat wliile secretary of war he gave 
his personal support to both the Quitman and Walker filibustering enterprises. 



Vol. IV, No. 4 j/^g Collapse of the Confederacy 441 

upon statesmanship and embraced a bold opportunism ; it is hard 
to see how this could be done by any man without violating 
certain of the finer qualities of his nature. In saying this, it is 
not to be inferred that Jefferson Davis was at all unique in this 
respect ; others in the north, the west, and the south, before and 
since, have gone off on the bypaths of political expediency. 
What should be made clear is that the south in the hour of her 
great crisis felt impelled to lean heavily upon a man of this type. 
To the southerner who had been able to follow critically and 
unemotionally Mr. Davis' presecession career, there might well 
have appeared something ominous in his selection for the pres- 
idency. 

What served to commend the ex-senator for the post, how- 
ever, was that he had won his way among men of ability to a 
position of almost unquestioned leadership in southern affairs; 
he possessed military training and experience; his practical 
knowledge of the details of government was a valuable asset to 
the confederacy; and he was respected for his personal purity, 
manliness, and courage. He was, moreover, considered to be 
among the more conservative of the secessionists in 1861.^^ 

What now may be said regarding the circumstances that gave 
rise to the war for separation? 

In considering these circumstances it can clearly be appre- 
ciated that the south was laboring under a heavy handicap. 
She was standing in the middle of the nineteenth century in 
defense of certain property rights and of her unique social 
order ; in doing this she was continually repelling with ever-in- 
creasing warmth various accusations which enemies of the slave 
regime were constantly hurling at her. Like those today who 
are interested in the sale of intoxicants, she was kept on the 
defense and like them she sought high moral and spiritual 
grounds in rebuttal. Unfortunately, she was standing for prop- 
erty rights as against particular human rights which an ever- 
increasingly large number of people throughout the world pas- 
sionately believed in ; that was a most serious element of weak- 

12 Mr. O. R. Singleton, writing in 1877 of the Mississippi conference held in 1861, 
says : ' ' The debate lasted many hours and Mr. Davis, witli perhaps one other gen- 
tleman in that conference opposed immediate and separate state action, declaring 
himself opposed to secession as long as the hope of a peaceable remedy remained." 
See Davis, Rise and fall of the confederate government, 1: 59. 



442 Lawrence H. Gipson ^- ^- ^- ^• 

ness in her cause. Anglo-Saxon legal history has shown that, 
buttressed as property is in the foundations of our English com- 
mon law, invariably property rights have had to give way to 
so-called human rights in any really decisive conflict. 

It has been recognized that southern leaders before the war 
not only had turned their backs upon certain world-wide ideals 
but also upon the fairest traditions of southern history.^^ When 
among leading southerners the broad humanitarianism of Jef- 
ferson, Washington, Madison, and John Randolph was repudiat- 
ed, together with the idealism of the declaration of independence, 
there must have followed a serious loss of moral energy. How 
otherwise can one account for the sanction given by plantation 
owners to the vast, illicit, foreign slave trade of the fifties, car- 
ried on by lawless skippers hailing from the northern seaports? 
How otherwise can one explain the support given in congress 
and out of the western Missouri element which brazenly defied 
all those democratic principles of government which the south 
since the days of Jefferson had contended were so precious? 
The fact is, that the south, after the invention of the cotton gin, 
gradually became as truly enslaved to a set of ideas, social and 
economic, which taken together made up the southern "system" 
as were the blacks themselves. It was "the system" that drove 
men to this opportunism. Yet, under the tremendous pressure 
of environmental forces, can it be reasonably doubted that had 
the Huguenot fugitives landed in Massachusetts Bay and the 
Puritans at Charleston, the former would have become the advo- 
cates of national emancipation and the latter the exponents of 
the theory that slavery was a divinely ordained and established 
institution? 

It should be understood that no attempt is being made to con- 
trast the moral qualities and ideals of the north and the south. 
If the present generation of Americans would not tolerate negro 
slavery they would look with little favor upon the heartless 
exploitation of almost millions of workers who swarmed in the 
great mill centers of the north during that period." Indeed, as 

13 It may also be true that the seeds of secession can be traced back to the extreme 
particularism of early southern statesmen. 

14 There are many facts to illustrate the condition of the mill hands in Carroll 
D. Wright, TJie factory system (Report on the manufactures of the United States 
at the tenth census, Washington, 1883). See also his Industrial evolution of the 



Vol. IV, No. 4 The Collapse of the Confederacy 443 

Mr. Dodd has pointed out, the lot of the slave ''under the pres- 
sure of outside criticism and the influence of religion ' ' was grow- 
ing better while that of the mill hand was becoming more unhap- 
py in many respects. As an example of the actual advantages 
of the slave over the mill hand, he saj'^s : ' " Against accident and 
disease more precautions were taken by masters of plantations 
than by masters of mills. . ."^^ If the north under fire of 
southern criticism had attempted to break up the union for the 
sake of preserving this grinding factory system, it also 
would have labored under a most serious handicap. It was the 
misfortune of the south to be plunged into war over the issue of 
slavery. It could not appeal to all men of southern feeling es- 
pecially under the given circumstances of secession. A serious 
and rational provocation w^as lacking. How differently would 
the south have been answered in its appeal for help had the 
northern radicals, for example, been able in 1860 to carry a con- 
stitutional amendment providing not only for the freedom of the 
slaves but also for their enfranchisement? Would not every 
man in the south have sprung to arms determined to fight to the 
bitter end? Would not Delaware, Maryland, Kentucky, Mis- 
souri, and southern Indiana and southern Illinois have poured 
their legions into the lap of the confederacy? Would not there 
have been created within the new government a degree of zeal 
that would have made the south literally unconquerable? But 
there was no such issue. 

The third psychological condition which, it was suggested, 
should be realized in order to give to a people in a great armed 

United States (New York, 1907) ; Reverend Henry A. Miles, Lowell as it loas and 
as it is (Lowell, 1845) ; J. L. Bishop, A history of American manufacture (Phila- 
delphia, 1861). The works, however, in the main defend the ante-bellum factory 
system. 

That the lot of the slave was not an unhappy one, as a rule, is evidenced by such 
northern writers as Frederick Law Olmstead who traveled extensively in the south. 
See his Journey in the seaboard slave states (New York, 1853) and his Journey in 
the bacic country (New York, 1860). Doubtless many a slave would have preferred 
his easy-going plantation life, where he was sheltered from the tragic vicissitudes of 
a cruel competitive regime, to an existence in the narrow lanes of the tenement sec- 
tion of a northern industrial center with its squalor and woe. 

15 ' ' Under the English common law accidents in the mills were matters of concern 
only to the employees, and the human toll of the railways was enormous. Years of 
toil, a worn-out frame, a dependent old age, and finally the potter's field was the 
weary round of life to the millions of dependent people who swarmed about the in- 
dustrial centers." William E. Dodd, Expansion and conflict (New York, 1815), 
210-21L 



444 Lawrence H. Gipson ^- ^- ^- ^• 

conflict maximum energy and enthusiasm, was that the end to 
be achieved should be clear and definite and worthy of any 
sacrifice. 

Why did the south secede? Her leaders in congress avowed 
that it was for nothing other than the protection of states' 
rights, which should be^given full recognition in the new gov- 
ernment to be created. Yet, must there not have been a lack of 
fine intellectual sincerity behind the promises of these leaders 
that in seceding from the union the south would be able upon the 
basis of extreme states' rights theory to build a nation that 
would not crumble to pieces under the first severe strain and 
leave that section plunged in the midst of anarchy! But it 
should be pointed out that many reasons and aims were ad- 
vanced by southerners as justification for secession; indeed 
there was no little confusion with reference to the purposes of 
this movement. J. B. Jones, editor of the Southern Monitor, 
wrote regarding secession: "The time had apparently come 
for us to set up for ourselves, and we should have done it if 
there had been no such thing as state sovereignty. ' ' He further 
declared that many ' ' are inclined to think the safest plan would 
be to obliterate state lines and merge them all into an indivisi- 
ble nation or empire, else there may be incessant conflicts be- 
tween the different sovereignties themselves, and between them 
and the general government. ' ' This plan he heartily approved, 
adding this significant statement, ' ' It is true, states ' rights gave 
the states the right to secede. But, what is in a name?"^*' 

If one can accept the conclusions of Gamaliel Bradford, it 
would appear that Lee, the darling of the confederacy, never 
knew what he was fighting for except that he must defend his 
native state Virginia and be true to the trust that the confeder- 
acy had placed upon him. There is evidence that even before 
his first invasion of the north he would have welcomed a peace 
that would have honorably restored the southern states to the 
union." He had freed himself from the charge of slaveholding 
and the idea that he was fighting to preserve slavery would have 
been well-nigh abhorrent to him. Yet R. M. T. Hunter, one of 

18 John B. Jones, A rebel war clerl- 's diary at the Confederate States capital 
(Philadelphia, 1866), 1: 24. 

17 Gamaliel Bradford, "Robert E. Lee," in the Atlantic monthly, 107:67. Re- 
printed in Confederate portraits (New York, 1914). 



Vol. IV, No. 4 The Collapse of the Confederacy 445 

the ablest Virginians, was convinced that the war was fought 
over that very issue. In the confederate senate in 1864 in op- 
posing Mr. Davis' emancipation scheme, he demanded to know 
why it was that the south went to war unless it was to maintain 
its property in slaves.^^ That Virginia went into the struggle 
for this reason is, however, denied by Mrs. Pryor, who with her 
husband, Senator Roger Pryor, embraced the southern cause in 
1861. In her Reminiscences she contends that Virginia left the 
union and joined the confederacy because she was called upon 
by President Lincoln to help subjugate the cotton states. Up 
to that time, according to Mrs. Pryor, Virginia was loyal to 
the union and it was her sympathy for states' rights which led 
her to secede." This view has also lately been developed by 
Beverly B. Munford in his volume on Virginia and seces- 
sion. ^° But was Virginia simply standing for the integrity of 
state sovereignty as against national encroachment? Does it 
seem likely that the Old Dominion state would have seceded if 
she had been called upon to help subjugate her daughter state 
Ohio, had the latter, under the influence of Wade and Chase, 
decided to leave the union for the purpose of setting up a na- 
tional government which prohibited slavery? 

While it is true that such men as Stephens and Rhett were 
blindly devoted to states' rights conceptions, how different was 
the attitude of such men as J. B. Jones with his imperial views 
and Jefferson Davis who '4n the interests of the South as a 
whole . . . would destroy an individual Southern state as 
ruthlessly as, in the interests of the Union as a whole, Webster 
might have done so ! " ^^ 

18 See D. R. Anderson, "Robert Mercer Galiaferro Hunter," in John P. Branch 
historical papers of Eandolph-Macon college, 2: no. 2, for facts regarding Hunter's 
career in the confederate senate. 

19 Mrs. Roger A. Pryor, Eeminiscences of peace and war (New York, 1904), 124. 
But as testimony contradictory to this R. M. T. Hunter, replying to those who feared 
that Virginia would not secede, declared: "You may place your little hand against 
Niagara with more certainty of staying the torrent than you can oppose this move- 
ment. " Ibid. Indeed Roger Pryor, who went to South Carolina from Virginia, 
promised the Carolinians that the firing on Sumter would carry Virginia from the 
union. As it were for a seal of faith, Ruffin, the ardent Virginia secessionist, was 
allowed to fire the first gun against the fort. 

20 Virginia's attitude toward slavery and secession (New York, 1909). 

21 Stephenson, "A theory of Jefferson Davis," in American historical review, 
21 : 84. 



446 Lawrence H. Gipson ^- ^- ^- ^• 

Is it not apparent that the purposes behind this grave step 
were not sufficiently clear and definite f Granted that they were 
included in that large expression "the protection of Southern 
interests," were there not many diverse opinions among south- 
ern people as to just what those interests were and how best 
they could be served ? 

The fourth important psychological condition that mani- 
festly should be realized by a nation hoping to carry forward 
with maximum efficiency a great armed conflict, is the whole- 
souled consecration of the people themselves to the desired end. 
Even if the leadership were excellent, and the circumstances 
giving rise to the struggle such as to make a profound appeal 
to fundamental justice and the ends to be attained ever so 
clear and laudable, there would yet be something of tremendous 
value lacking if those who were involved were unable to dedicate 
themselves completely to the task of maintaining the govern- 
ment responsible for leading them successfully to a realization 
of their hopes. 

The confederacy started out with the appearance of great 
unanimity, but this did not last long. The delegates to the con- 
stituent convention, aside from suggesting for consideration the 
names of Kobert Toombs and Howell Cobb for the presidency, 
did not hesitate long before deciding upon Mr. Davis, who, de- 
siring military glory in the coming war, reluctantly accepted 
the post of chief executive. Beneath the smooth surface, how- 
ever, there was the stirring of waters ; for, while everyone ap- 
peared to be gratified, there were heartburnings and jealousies 
over that choice which never healed. Such aggressively ambiti- 
ous men as William L. Yancey of Alabama, Robert Barnwall 
Rhett of South Carolina, and Robert Toombs of Georgia could 
not easily be appeased. But, for a time, all was fair. Yancey 
welcomed the president-elect to Montgomery and Rhett wel- 
comed him in the name of the convention, while Toombs grace- 
fully accepted the highest post of honor in the cabinet. Yancey, 
also, was quieted temporarily by an appointment as commission- 
er to England. Although the newly elected vice president, 
Alexander H. Stephens, had ardently desired that Toombs 
should receive the highest office in the gift of the people, he also 
appeared at first well-disposed toward the recipient of that high 
honor. 



Vol. IV, No. 4 jjjiQ Collapse of the Confederacy 447 

The president, indeed, began his administration on a wave of 
popularity. Colonel Freemantle of the English Coldstream 
Guards, who was in the south at the beginning of the war, wrote 
regarding the general feeling toward Jefferson Davis, "People 
speak of any misfortune happening to him as an irreparable 
evil, too dreadful to contemplate.""^ His first responsibility 
was the selection of a cabinet. In doing this, he showed a de- 
sire to win the support of those who had not been hearty seces- 
sionists. Practically every portfolio, except that of the secre- 
taryship of state, was tendered to a member of the more con- 
servative group. Some of these appointees were distinctly un- 
popular in their own states. This was Mr. Davis' first grave 
mistake ; other means should have been taken to satisfy the con- 
servatives. He had no illusions as to the possibility of a peace- 
able establishment of the confederacy; all his previous utter- 
ances point to the fact that he anticipated a long and bloody war. 
How could he expect that these men who were timid and hesi- 
tating in thought and action would be able to develop the neces- 
sary energy to put the young nation in a proper state of defense ? 
There was not a moment to spare; the task was gigantic; yet 
even the secretary of war, Leroy P. Walker, the man who above 
every one else should have seen the importance of mobilizing 
the entire resources of the south with greatest dispatch, actually 
went up and down Alabama boasting that he would wipe up with 
his handkerchief all the blood that would be shed!^^ All the 
cotton bales in Alabama would not have sufficed ! It would ap- 
pear that at the first cabinet meeting Attorney-General Judah 
P. Benjamin was the only man who saw the seriousness of the 
situation or who expected a hard fight, and who had a plan to 
suggest whereby the confederacy might be saved.^* The other 
members went so far as practically to ridicule the idea that a 
great war was upon them. Imagine the paralyzing effect of this 
attitude ! 

Another serious error that the president made was in offering 
to Yancey, the Alabama fire eater, the mission to London. Yan- 

22 Lieutenant-Colonel Freemantle, Three months in the southern states, April, May 
and June, 1863 (New York, 1863), 214. Colonel Freemantle was charmed by Mr. 
Davis' personality. 

23 Pierce Butler, Judah P. Benjamin (Philadelphia, [1907]), 232. 

24 lUd. 



448 Lawrence H. Gipson ^- ^- ^- ^• 

cey, with his radical ways, was not fitted "in the remotest 
degree for the delicate and all-important duties of Confederate 
diplomacy. ' ' ^^ When too late Yancey himself came to appreci- 
ate this fact. It would certainly appear that a group of the 
most thoughtful and cultured men of the Robert Barnwall and 
R. M. T. Hunter type should have been selected at this time for 
the mission to England. They would have done much undoubt- 
edly to inspire confidence among the influential in the southern 
program. They might possibly have thoroughly checkmated the 
shrewd moves of Charles Francis Adams and Robert J. Walker, 
the northern representatives in England, and thus have enlisted 
the financial support of Lombard street to such an extent that 
sufficient pressure would have been brought to bear upon the 
government to insure recognition of the confederacy. But Yan- 
cey at St. James' was impossible.'*' 

The question of places and appointments was one that pre- 
sented to Mr. Davis extraordinary difficulties and resulted in a 
vast amount of discord. It was a serious problem for Lincoln, 
but Lincoln 's problem was comparatively simple as compared to 
that which confronted the confederate president. It probably 
would be little of an exaggeration to say that practically every 
southern man of prominence expected distinguished recognition 
of some sort on the part of the new government. The act of 
Robert Barnwall in refusing the secretaryship-of-state must be 
regarded as most exceptional. The ignoring of such a man as 
Rhett and the adding of insult to injury by the appointment of a 
political enemy such as C. G. Memminger to high office could 
have but one result. As Barnwall put it, ''Rhett had howled 
nullification so long, he felt that he had a vested right to leader- 
ship. ' ' ^^ What was needed was a spirit of self-abnegation ; but 

25 Dodd, Jefferson Davis, 228. With Yancey was associated P. A. Rost and A. 
Dudley Mann. 

26 For facts regarding Yancey see John W. DuBose, Life and times of William 
Loivndes Yancey: a history of political parties in the United States, from 1834 to 
1864, especially as to the origin of the Confederate States (Birnnngham, 1892) ; 
William G. Brown, The louwr south in American history (New York, 1902) ; and 
Joseph Hodgson, The cradle of the confederacy; or, the times of Troup, Quitman and 
Yancey; a sketch of southwestern political history from the formation of the federal 
government to A. D. 1861 (Mobile, 1876). 

27 A diary from Dixie, as ioritten by Mary Boylcin Chesnut, wife of James Chcs- 
nut, jr., United States senator from South Carolina, 1859-1861, and afterward an aide 



Vol. rv, No. 4 The Collapse of the Confederacy 449 

that grace was lacking. That this was so, however, should hard- 
ly cause surprise. Almost from childhood, as a rule, southern 
men of the leading families had been accustomed to command 
and exact obedience from others.^* 

It is important to bear in mind that leaders in southern af- 
fairs, as a class, had developed a habit of opposition and self- 
assertiveness which had become almost fundamental to many of 
them. To such men as Yancey, Rhett, Toombs, John M. Daniel, 
and Henry S. Foote, bitter opposition to government was the 
normal thing. The government might change but opposition still 

to Jefferson Davis and a 'brigadier-general in the confederate army (Martin and 
Avary ed. — New York, 1905), 104. 

The following letter written from Charleston, South Carolina, May 21, 1863, by A. 
A. McBryde excellently illustrates the attitude of mind displayed by far too many 
southerners : 

To the Confederate Secretary of State, 
Eichmond, Va. 

Sir: I respectfully desire to be sent to Great Britain by the Confederate gov- 
ernment as Secret Agent for fermenting and keeping up in those Islands, and conse- 
quently in other European States, a political feeling favorable to the welfare and 
interests of the Confederacy. 

I would like an early reply from the Department. If you should determine not 
to give me the appointment, just say so, and bestow it on a Virginian of course — 
and after the war let South Carolina shoulder the Confederate Debt. 

Please address me for three months to come at Eandelsville, N. Carolina. 

I am, Sir, 

With High Eegards, 

Arch'd Arne McBryde 

P. S. Please reply immediately, inclose my commission, my instructions, and a 
draft on some Confederate depository for the funds necessary for reaching Europe 
and my residence there. A. A. McB. 

This letter is found on page 134 of applications for office, Pickett papers in the 
library of congi-ess. 

28 Perhaps no one had a better opportunity to observe the effects of this attitude 
of mind on the fortunes of the government than Mrs. James Chesnut, who with her 
husband enjoyed the confidence of the highest confederate officials. In her Diary 
from Dixie time and time again she refers to the formidable aspect of this problem 
for the administration. Mr. Davis was literally hounded by crowds of men each de- 
siring through some avenue or other to take charge of the government affairs. Many, 
such as ex-Senator Wigfall of Texas, became bitterly hostile when the president 
would not go into leading strings to them. See also Mrs. Varina H. Davis, Jefferson 
Davis, ex-president of the Confederate States of America; a memoir iy his wife 
(New York, [1890]); Jones, A rebel clerl'-.'s diary; Jefferson Davis, A short history 
of the Confederate States of America (New York, 1890) ; Frank H. Alfriend, Life 
of Jefferson Davis (Philadelphia, 1868), besides the applications for office in the 
Pickett papers. 



450 Lawrence H. Gipson ^- ^- ^- S- 

continues. What does this point to? Surely nothing other than 
a ''personalism" that had grown out of all social bounds. The 
following pen picture of a southern plantation lord left by a con- 
temporary adequately illustrates this point : 

'* Colonel Chesnut now ninety- three, blind and deaf, is appar- 
ently as strong as ever and certainly as resolute of will. Partly 
patriarch, partly grand seigneur, this old man is of a species that 
we will see no more — ;the last of a race of lordly planters who 
ruled this Southern world, but now a splendid wreck. His man- 
ners are unequalled still, but underneath the smooth exterior 
lies the grip of a tyrant whose will has never been crossed."'-^ 

As long as any section of the republic was dominated by men 
who never knew what submission to the will of another meant, 
could the United States ever be a nation in the sense of a body 
of people submitting themselves to great common purposes and 
ideals? More than that, could any government hope to thrive 
planted in the midst of such a social regime ? Did not that mas- 
terful spirit of individualism, fostered by the patriarchal type 
of life developed in the south, speed, through secession, toward 
the only possible goal prepared for it, its self destruction? The 
antebellum south differed in many respects from the south that 
survived the w^ar; it was not only different on account of the 
altered status of the blacks and by reason of the general desola- 
tion, but also because of the fact, mournfully engraved upon the 
records of those times, that the most imperious of the defenders 
of that old individualism, those untamed, fiery men who had 
rushed to arms at the first bugle call, were almost wiped out of 
existence on a hundred bloody fields. 

It is not surprising, therefore, in view of this extreme "per- 
sonalism," to read in Mrs. Chesnut 's diary that already in July, 
1861, ''this cabinet of ours are in such bitter quarrels among 
themselves — everybody abusing everybody"^" and then again, 
that ''there is a perfect magazine of discord and disunion in the 
cabinet." Indeed, it is surprising what pluck the south showed 
in keeping up the struggle as she did in spite of this fearful 

29 A diary from Dixie, as written by Mary Boyl'in Chesnut, 390, 391. ' ' Slavery, 
by building up a ruling and dominant class had produced a spirit of oligarchy ad- 
verse to republican institutions, which finally inaugurated the Civil War." Eeport 
of the joint committee on reconstruction, 39 congress, 1 session, xiv. 

30 /bid., 90. 



Vol. IV, No. 4 xhe Collapse of the Confederacy 451 

drawback of everybody's trying to be master. When the mem- 
bers of the cabinet found out that there was a will above them 
more domineering than any of their own, the more high-spirited 
withdrew; others were withdrawn. President Davis was obliged 
to appoint five times a secretary of war. But nothing put a stop 
to the incessant discords within the cabinet. The public, in fact, 
was fed upon this lack of unity. 

Secretary of State Robert Toombs set an example of incor- 
rigible independence to the others by committing the unpardon- 
able breach of official etiquette in openly and insolently de- 
nouncing the war policy of the government. ^^ Soon afterwards 
he withdrew in scorn from this post of intolerable subordination 
to the chief executive to seek laurels on the battlefield. "In- 
compatibility of temper" was the explanation offered by a con- 
temporary who was acquainted with the facts in the case. "Mr. 
Toombs rides too high a horse ; that is, for so despotic a person 
as Jeff Davis. ' ' '^ But Toombs in the army was just as unhappy 
and unmanageable as in the cabinet ; he stormed at his superior 
officers when he was crossed, occasionally disobeyed direct or- 
ders, and even had the audacity to challenge his commanding 
officer, D. H. Hill, to a duel. By the middle of 1862, one who 
knew him well wrote, "Toombs is ready for another revolution 
and curses freely everything Confederate from the President 
down to a horse boy. He thinks there is a conspiracy against 
him in the army. ' ' ^^ After Antietam he threw up his commis- 
sion in the army and retired to Georgia to make war on the 
administration.^* 

31 Jones, A rebel cleric's diary. "He shows Toombs at the war office, while Secre- 
tary of State, pouring out his views. He was bold even to rashness in his denuncia- 
tions of the manly defensive. He was for making war as terrible as possible from 
the beginning." Gamaliel Bradford, "Robert Toombs," in Atlantic monthly, 112: 
216. 

32 A diary from Dixie, as ivritten by Mary Boylcin Chesnut, 108. 

^^Ibid. Pleasant A. Stovall, Bobert Toombs, statesman, spealier, soldier, sage: 
his career in congress and on the hustings — his loorTc in the courts — his record in 
the army — his life at home (New York, [1892]), offers many interesting facts re- 
garding the career of this remarkable man. But see especially Ulrich B. Phillips, 
Life of Robert Toombs (New York, 1913). 

34 In a letter written in 1862, Toombs declared: "Davis's incapacity is lamentable 
and the very thought of the baseness of congress in the impressment act makes me 
sick. I feel but little like fighting for a people base enough to submit to such des- 
potism from such contemptible sources." "The correspondence of Robert Toombs, 



452 Lawrence H. Gipson ^- ^- h. R. 

In giving any account of the breaking down of the confederate 
morale, the name of Alexander H. Stephens cannot be omitted. 
As vice president he offered a great problem to the head of the 
confederacy for he was not the type of individual to work har- 
moniously with Jefferson Davis. The man who could submit to 
being stabbed eighteen times by a bitter political opponent, 
Judge Cone, without retracting the lie he had given, and who, 
as the result of political differences challenged not only Benja- 
min H. Hill but also Hershel V. Johnson to duels on different 
occasions, would hardly fail to clash with the man who had be- 
come the drillmaster of the confederacy. Previous to secession 
his attitude had been one of exalted patriotism and unionism, 
while theoretically conceding the constitutional right of a state 
to withdraw ; he had been very reluctant to leave the union and 
when things began to miscarry in the confederacy, it could hard- 
ly be expected that he should show quite the fortitude of men 
who were ardent secessionists. Stephens, it should be appreci- 
ated, was an ''intellectual," and an ''intellectual" is apt to be a 
dangerous man in a great crisis of a people. Wliat is needed at 
such a time is clear vision and wisdom. Stephens was lack- 
ing in this. Standing with fatal consistency for "the ultimate 
absolute sovereignty of the several states, "^^ he did not seem to 
appreciate how vitally necessary it was for all southerners in 
this terrible armed conflict to lay aside for the moment a discus- 
sion of political theories only applicable in times of peace. As 
Gamaliel Bradford has pointed out, Stephens "was a deductive 
thinker of an older type. He reasoned from accepted general- 
izations to very positive conclusions and even in this line his 
thinking was neither profound nor original. ' ' ^^ His doctrinaire 

Alexander H. Stephens, and Howell Cobb," edited by Ulrich B. Phillips, in American 
historical association. Annual report, 1911 (Washington, 1913), 2: 595. E. M. T. 
Hunter, who was called to the vacant post of secretary of state upon the withdrawal 
of Toombs, although known as a man of genial temper also found it impossible to 
endure the dictatorial ways of Mr. Davis, and in 1862 he withdrew from the cabinet. 
Elected to the confederate senate by Virginia, he joined the opposition which was 
ardently pursuing the president. See Anderson, "Robert Mercer Taliaferro Hunter," 
in John P. Branch historical papers of Bandolph-Macon college, 2 : no. 2 ; and Martha 
T. Hunter, A memoir of Bohert H. T. Hunter (Washington, 1903) ; Resignations from 
oflSee, 142, in Pickett papers. 

35 ' ' Correspondence of Toombs, Stephens and Cobb, ' ' in American historical asso- 
ciation, Annual report, 1911, 2: 655. 

36 Bradford, "Alexander H. Stephens," in Atlantic monthly, 112: 70. 



Vol. IV, No. 4 j/^g Collapse of the Confederacy 453 

qualities of mind came out in the sublime faith he showed in the 
efficacy of his own theories when applied under impossible con- 
ditions ; time and again he was the victim of his own logic." 

For two years of his vice presidency, this burning soul, like 
Saul, sulked in his tent, remaining in Georgia away from his 
post of duty. He opposed practically every measure that the 
government brought forth. Conscription, martial law, and 
various financial measures were his special abhorrence ; his loy- 
alty to the confederacy which he had sworn to maintain was at 
times in question ; so far did he lose faith in the Richmond gov- 
ernment that he insistently demanded that a peace commission 
under authority of the sovereign states and quite independent 
of the confederate administration be sent to negotiate with the 
federal government ! ^^ How could the activities of such a man 
with all his magnetic qualities fail to spread broadcast a spirit 
of distrust and intense dislike for the central administration? 

37 Mr. N. W. Stephenson, however, contends that ' ' Rhett and Stephens were as far 
from being doctrinaires as is the modern Bulgarian, the modern Montenegrin." "A 
theory of Jefferson Davis," in American historical review, 21:86. He illustrates 
his point when referring to Ehett by the following statement : ' ' He is the very type 
of the thoroughgoing states' rights man who is animated by a real love for his par- 
ticular state — as real as a Bulgarian's for Bulgaria — who was as resolute not to 
have his state submerged in the Confederacy as is the modern Bulgarian not to have 
his own country in, say, a united Byzantine empire." Ibid., 21: 82. While it is true 
that this devotion to the idea of state particularism was strong with such men as 
Rhett and Stephens and in that portion of the south where they lived, and while it is 
perfectly understandable that it should be so, the point may be raised that neither of 
these men had any proper conception regarding the means that necessarily must be 
taken under given conditions to preserve these sovereign states from reconquest by 
the federal government and to establish them in their freedom under the states' 
rights constitution of the confederacy. Rhett, who had been so willing to make war 
on the union, could not realize that war to be successfully prosecuted inevitably neces- 
situated an abridgment of individual freedom. This was the trouble with Stephens, 
crying out against President Davis' program for an efficient conduct of military 
affairs. ' ' His whole policy on the organization and discipline of the army, ' ' Stephens 
asserted, "is perfectly consistent with the hypothesis that he is aiming at absolute 
power." War of the rebellion: a compilation of the official records of the union 
and confederate armies (Washington, 1880-1901), fourth series, 3: 279, 280. Stephens 
took the position "that the idea of getting independence first and constitutional 
rights afterward was false because ' our liberties once lost may be lost forever. ' ' ' 
American historical review, 21:84. A doctrinaire, according to Webster, is "one 
who would apply to political and other practical concerns the abstract doctrines or 
the theories of his own philosophical system without enough regard to actual condi- 
tions. ' ' 

38 John C. Schwab, The Confederate States of America, 1861-1865: a financial and 
industrial history of the south during the civil war (New York, 1901), 227. 



454 Lawrence H. Gipson ^- ^- S- ^■ 

If what has been said regarding the relations of Toombs and 
Stephens toward the government had been exceptional, it might 
not have been so disastrous; but scores of men, prominent in 
their own sections, were pursuing the administration with the 
same relentless and outspoken hostility. Out of this situation 
developed a series of feuds hardly to be surpassed in the in- 
tensity of feeling displayed. 

"What made these feuds most demoralizing in their effects was 
the way in which the press added fuel to them. For in this life 
and death struggle of the young nation, when everything depend- 
ed upon a subordination of private opinion and feeling to the 
plans of those entrusted with power, southern individualism 
would not tolerate the thought of restraining the license of a 
press which in its very blindness actually warred against its own 
just freedom. Almost from the very beginning Ehett's powerful 
Charleston Mercury was hostile to the government; before the 
close of the war its vituperation was poured freely upon the 
head of the confederacy. ''Jefferson Davis," it asserted on one 
occasion, "treats all men as if they were idiotic insects. "^^ The 
even more powerful Richmond Examiner under the editorship of 
John M. Daniel and his associate Edward A. Pollard, changed 
from ardent support to bitterest hatred of Mr. Davis. The lat- 
ter at the beginning of the war was a man of "courage, patriot- 
ism, experience, and wisdom;" by 1865 he had become "an 
amalgam of malice and mediocrity." 

Hardly anything could exceed the scathing quality of Daniel's 
language and he never seemed to be happy unless furiously at- 
tacking someone. As a result he was involved in a series of 
personal encounters. Stung to madness by his venomous pen, 
Marmaduke Johnson in 1861 made a deadly assault upon him 
with a knife ; even Ellmore, in charge of the confederate treas- 
ury, felt obliged in 1864 to fight him. The breach between the 
president and the Examiner seems to have orioinated over the 
question of conscription which Daniel favored but which Mr. 

39 For this and other press opinions see Bradford 's chapter ' ' Jefferson Davis, ' ' in 
Confederate 'portraits. James G. Eandall approaches the consideration of the civil 
war press from another angle in his "The newspaper problem in its bearing upon 
military secrecy during the civil war," in American historical review, 23: 303-323. 



Vol. IV, No. 4 j/^g Collapse of the Confederacy 455 

Davis at first opposed.*" Soon this paper became a strong pro- 
Joseph E. Johnston organ and at last surrendered itself utterly 
to the enemies of the administration irrespective of the issue in- 
volved. If any man ever hated his way into the grave, John M. 
Daniel might claim that doubtful distinction.*^ 

What previously has been said regarding the breaking down 
of the morale of the confederacy has had to do with those in civil 
life. It is also necessary to consider the effects of the famous 
army feud. This arose over the question of the appointment of 
the supreme field commander. The choice lay between P. G. T. 
Beauregard, Albert Sydney Johnston, Joseph E. Johnston, and 
Robert E. Lee. The placing of Albert Sydney Johnston at the 
head of the list immediately resulted in deep and scarcely veiled 
resentment on the part of both Joseph E. Johnston and Beaure- 
gard. Their friends, many and influential, caught up the cry 
and the baying of these foes of President Davis was never 
hushed until he with every one of these rivals for military power 
was in the grave. *^ 

One of the most insistent accusations leveled against Mr. 
Davis by his enemies was that of favoritism in connection with 
his military appointments. Scarcely a month after Manassas, 
Mrs. Chesnut wrote in her diary, ''Now if I were to pick out the 
best abused one, where all catch it so bountifully, I should say 
Mr. Comissary-General Northrop is the most 'cussed' and 
vilified man in the Confederacy. He is held accountable for 
everything that goes wrong in the army. He may not be efficient 
but having been a classmate and crony of Jeff Davis at West 

40 See Richmond Examiner^ March 18, 1862. 

41 For a brief account of his career see A. N. Wilkenson, ' ' John Moncur Daniel, ' ' 
in Eichmond college historical papers, 1, number 1. 

42 A wealth of material upon this army disj^ute is to be found in official publica- 
tions, particularly The war of the rebellion: a compilation of the official records of 
the union and confederate armies. The arguments for both sides are to be found in 
such works as Davis, Bise and fall of the confederate government; Joseph E. John- 
ston, Narrative of military operations, directed, during the late war betiveen the 
states (New York, 1874) ; E. M. [William] Hughes, General Johnston (New York, 
1893) ; Alfred Eoman, Military operations of General Beauregard in the war between 
the states, 1861 to 1865 ; including a brief personal sTcetch and a narrative of his 
services in the war with Mexico, 1846-1848 (New York, 1884) ; General J. B. Hood, 
Advance and retreat; personal reminiscences in the United States and Confederate 



456 Lawrence H. Gipson ^- ^- h. e. 

Point, points the moral and adorns the tale."" The allowing of 
Davis ' friends, John C. Pemberton and Braxton Bragg, to keep 
their commands was denounced everywhere in the south. The 
Richmond Examiner, which was the most popular paper among 
army men, carried its abuse of these generals into the ranks of 
their soldiers. This, of course, struck right at the morale of the 
troops. Who could be expected to fight with confidence and 
relish under a commander like Bragg, contemptuously flouted 
as a **man of iron hand and wooden head?"" Is it any 
wonder that the president should charge in his report that the 
cause for the escape of the federal army at Chickamauga was 
the fact that some of Bragg's subordinates disobeyed positive 
orders? Is it surprising that the president was obliged to repri- 
mand certain portions of Bragg's army because of an utter lack 
of spirit in the battle of Chattanooga? 

General Joseph E. Johnston was perhaps the most implacable 
foe that Mr. Davis had in the army. He was a thoroughly em- 
bittered man. Among those who went over to the southern side 
he had the highest rank in the federal army; in tendering his 
services to the confederacy he was given every reason to expect 
the leading command which, however, as has been previously 
noted, was tendered to Albert Sydney Johnston. Added to this 
affront, when he was wounded at Fair Oaks his command of the 
army of Virginia was permanently given to Lee. Later, trans- 
ferred to the west, he was obliged to submit to the president's 
determination to leave Pemberton and Bragg under him al- 
though he had no confidence in them. The extent of distrust 
that General Johnston and President Davis displayed towards 
each other would be hard to parallel in American history. John- 
ston actually came to believe that Mr. Davis cared more about 
ruining him than saving the confederacy; he felt that he did 
not dare to communicate his plans of operation to the presi- 
dent.** On the other hand, Jefferson Davis practically accused 

states armies (New Orleans, 1880) ; Mrs. Louise Wigfall Wright, A southern girl in 
'61; the war-time memories of a confederate senator's daughter (New York, 1905). 
*^ A diary from Dixie, as written hy Mary BoyJcin Chesnut, 97. Northrop is 
strongly defended in Alfriend, Life of Jefferson Davis. 

44 See the sketch by A. N. Wilkinson on ' ' John Moncur Daniel, ' ' in Bichmond 
college historical papers, 1, number 1. 

45 ' ' Joe Johnston does not exactly say that Jeff Davis betrays his plans to the 



Vol. IV, No. 4 The Collapse of the Confederacy 457 

Johnston of betraying" him into the hands of the enemy in the 
last hours of the confederacy and of weakly allowing the bottom 
to fall out of the southern cause. 

If there was anything lacking to complete the destruction of 
morale among southerners it seemed to have been supplied in 
the quarrel that broke out between the confederate government 
and the separate states over various questions such as conscrip- 
tion and martial law. Governors Joseph E. Brown of Georgia 
and Zebulon B. Vance of North Carolina rivalled each other in 
setting up states' rights pretensions. These influential men went 
about denouncing President Davis's despotic methods. In 1864 
North Carolina even became mutinous ; her troops, according to 
Lee, deserted almost by the company and when the president 
tried to recover the men owing military services, Vance went 
so far as to threaten to take North Carolina out of the con- 
federacy ! *® 

As a climax to all this confusion of counsels, when states' 
rights, according to the enemies of Mr. Davis, had become a 
mockery, the confederate government, turning its back upon the 
last possible valid excuse that it had to offer for the breaking 
up of the union, embraced the policy of emancipation. The ne- 
groes were not only under certain conditions to be freed, but 
what is more astounding, they were to be freed for the purpose 
of turning them into fighters with arms in their hands. The 
mere thought of having the southern negroes ever become skilled 
in the use of arms was something that since the days of Nat 
Turner the south had been able to contemplate only with horror ! 
But no such desperate plan could then save the confederacy, a 
sad wreck toppling into a grave that only too largely had been 
prepared by its own hands. The time had passed when any but 
the most devoted would raise an arm in its name. Over a hun- 
dred thousand soldiers, it is estimated, taking counsel of them- 
selves, had deserted the ranks; the loyal who stayed were the 
starving victims of a broken down commissary and a helpless ad- 
ministration. In the midst of this accumulation of disaster and 

enemy, but he says he dares not let the President know his plans as there is a spy in 
the war office who invariably warns the Yankees in time. That's Wigf all's way of 
talking!" A diary from Dixie, as written ly Mary BoyTiin Chesnut, 320. 
46 For a good discussion of this see Dodd, Jefferson Davis, 334-340. 



458 Lawrence H. Gipson ^- ^- S- ^ 

woe that would have crushed the spirit of a Napoleon, President 
Davis clung with pathetic tenacity to the idea, now an obsession, 
that the cause would still be saved. Not until he was a deserted 
fugitive did that hope fade away. 

The south, agricultural in its economy, was throttled by the 
blockade,^^ paralyzed by the breakdown of her arteries of com- 
munication, the railroads,*^ and crushed through military prow- 
ess. Yet there was much truth in Lee's declaration, when, even 
so late as February, 1865, he insisted that the confederate ''re- 
sources fitly and vigorously employed are ample." An ab- 
normal individualism joining hands with its concomitant ex- 
treme state particularism had borne all its bitter fruit. The 
prophecy that Robert Toombs made in 1861 when he warned 
President Davis never to open fire on Fort Sumter had come 
true. For, declared Toombs, it will ''lose us every friend in the 
North . . . legions now quiet will swarm out and sting us 
to death." But it was a people stung to death who were at the 
same time distracted unto desperation by internal strife, a peo- 
ple in need of a great leader, many of them now questioning the 
justification of secession and still more uncertain as to the end 
in view. 

Lawkence Henry Gipson 
Wabash College 
Crawfokdsville, Indiana 

47 The standard authority on this, of course is John C. Schwab, Confederate States 
of America 1861-65. 

48 Mr. C. W. Ramsdell is making a very important study of the relationship of the 
disorganization of the southern railway system to the military fortunes of the confed- 
eracy. See his "Confederate government and the railroads," in the American his- 
torical review, 22 : 794-811. 



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